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This paper offers an economic assessment of the opportunities and challenges 
provided by the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, particularly through agricultural 
trade liberalization, for low-income countries seeking to trade their way out of 
poverty. After discussing links between poverty, economic growth and trade, it 
reports modeling results showing that farm product markets remain the most costly of 
all goods market distortions in world trade. It focuses on what such reform might 
mean for developing countries both without and with their involvement in the 
multilateral trade negotiations. What becomes clear is that if those countries want to 
maximize their benefits from the Doha round, they need also to free up their own 
domestic product and factor markets so their farmers are better able to take advantage 
of new market opportunities abroad. Other concerns of low-income countries about 
farm trade reform also are addressed: whether there would be losses associated with 
tariff preference erosion, whether food-importing countries would suffer from higher 
food prices in international markets, whether China’s WTO accession will provide an 
example of trade reform aggravating poverty via cuts in prices received by Chinese 
farmers, and the impact on food security and poverty alleviation.  
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The first of the eight Millennium Development Goals articulated at the UN 
General Assembly in 2000 was to halve by 2015 the proportion of people in absolute 
poverty, that is, those living on less than US$1 per day and suffering from hunger. 
Throughout most of the 19
th and 20
th centuries, the number of people in the world that 
were poverty stricken had been increasing almost continually (Bouguignon and 
Morrisson 2002). Since the late 1970s, however, the number has declined by more 
than 200 million (Sala-i-Martin 2002). Remarkable though that recent achievement 
has been in such a short period, the World Bank estimates that there were still as 
many as one in five people, or 1.2 billion, below that poverty line in 2000 (e.g., 
Collier and Dollar 2002, Figure 3).
1  
Efforts to alleviate poverty for those remaining poor people, if they are to be 
successful, need to be based on a clear understanding of the reasons behind successful 
alleviation to date. The evidence presented by Sala-i-Martin suggests aggregate 
economic growth differences have been largely responsible for the differences in 
poverty alleviation across regions, a finding supported by numerous other studies 
(e.g., Dollar and Kraay 2002). Initiatives that boost economic growth are therefore 
likely to be helpful in the fight against absolute poverty.  
Trade liberalization is such an initiative that tends to boost economic growth.
2 
But it also alters relative product prices, which in turn affect factor prices (Lloyd 
2000; Ruffin and Jones 1977, 2004). Hence its net effects on poverty and hunger 
reduction depend also on the signs of those domestic product price changes and how 
                                                 
1 Sala-i-Martin’s data suggest the number has fallen to 350 million, at least in 1985 PPP terms. Even if 
that lower figure were to be correct, it is an unacceptable number of people in extreme poverty. 
2 The link between openness and economic growth, while not completely unambiguous and universal, 
is strong, and there is no evidence that openness is harmful to growth (see the discussion in McCulloch, 
Winters and Cirera 2001, Ch. 2). Trade’s impact on growth can be much reduced in the absence of 
liberal domestic markets, macro stability, and appropriate institutions and infrastructure, however, 
since those are all necessary to enable producers to respond to changes in international market signals 
(Hoekman et al. 2001). For a comprehensive survey of the links between trade, growth and poverty, see 
Berg and Krueger (2002). The theory is also covered succinctly in Winters (2002) while a survey of the 
empirical evidence (at least for own-country liberalization) is available in Winters, McCulloch and 
McKay (2002).   2
they affect domestic factor prices, on the price and quantity of food available for 
consumption, and hence on real individual and household incomes. If the price 
changes (whether due to own-country reforms and/or those of other countries) are 
pro-poor, then they will tend to reinforce any positive growth effects of trade reform 
on the poor, although the outcome depends also on the extent to which changes in 
border measures and complementary domestic policies do the following: 
 
•  Create new markets that are pro-poor; 
•  Stimulate the poor to respond to altered prices and new market opportunities; 
•  Provide second-round spillover effects that are pro-poor; 
•  Minimize any transitional unemployment that is concentrated on the poor; 
•  Raise government revenue that leads to pro-poor public expenditure; and 
•  Reduce the vulnerability of the poor. 
 
The present paper explores the potential poverty implications of one aspect of 
the current Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade 
liberalization agenda. At the WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, members 
agreed, in launching the next comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTNs), that there would be a substantial focus on development concerns (see the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration in WTO (2001b)). Even so, numerous people in 
developing countries remain skeptical that they will receive sufficient gains from that 
MTN to warrant the inevitable costs of negotiations and adjustments.
3 They (and 
some in the donor community) are skeptical not least because they perceive the 
OECD countries as unwilling to provide developing countries access to highly 
protected agricultural and textile markets. Some of them also are yet to be convinced 
that reducing distortions in world food markets would alleviate rather than add to 
poverty and food insecurity in developing countries. For example, those in net food-
importing developing countries worry that, because of a higher food import bill, their 
economies will be worse off because of agricultural trade reform that raises 
international food prices. Yet two-thirds of the world’s poor live in rural areas and, in 
least-developed countries, the proportion is as high as 90 percent (OECD 2003, p. 3). 
If those poor rural households are net sellers of food, an alternative prior is that 
agricultural trade liberalization abroad would favor most poor households in countries 
                                                 
3 Their scepticism is supported by recent reviews of the benefits to date to developing countries from 
the Uruguay Round. On the UR Agreement on Agriculture, for example, see Matthews (2002).   3
where the boost to international food prices is transmitted to those food-surplus 
households. The issue becomes more complex for developing countries that also 
reduce their own distortionary trade policies, the poverty outcome of which depends 
heavily on whether that own-country reform raises or lowers the relative price of food 
domestically. Given these differing priors, the aspect of the WTO negotiations 
focused on in this paper is the poverty impact of agricultural policy reform relative to 
liberalizing trade in other goods.
4  
The paper addresses the effects of trade reform on global poverty at three 
levels: first on developing countries as a group; then on different types of developing 
countries; and finally on different types of households within developing countries. 
We begin by summarizing global economic modeling results showing the effects of 
goods trade distortions expected to still be in place in 2005 (that is, post-Uruguay 
Round). Those results support the view that agricultural trade policies remain by far 
the most costly of all goods market distortions in world trade. What also becomes 
clear from those results is that if developing countries want to maximize their benefits 
from the Doha MTN round, they need also to free up their own agricultural (and 
other) markets so their producers are better able to take advantage of new market-
opening opportunities abroad. The paper then addresses such questions as whether 
some developing countries would be made worse off through tariff preference 
erosion, whether net food-importing developing economies would suffer from higher 
food prices in international markets, and whether Doha would worsen food security 
for the urban poor in developing countries. To help answer those questions by way of 
example, the paper also examines China’s accession to WTO, which involves altering 
relative prices in China to a much larger extent than the Doha Round is likely to 
impose on WTO member countries. While the conventional wisdom has been that 
WTO accession for China will exacerbate poverty in that country, the results 
summarized below offer a somewhat more optimistic view, particularly if mooted 
reforms to domestic policies are implemented. The paper concludes with suggestions 
of ways to increase the prospects of a pro-poor reform outcome from the Doha 
                                                 
4 An additional reason for focusing on agriculture is that – contrary to conventional wisdom – 
productivity growth in agriculture historically has outpaced that in manufacturing, including in 
developing countries (Martin and Mitra 2001). That empirical evidence suggests liberalizing markets 
for farm products could provide an above-average boost to economic growth in poor countries, ceteris 
paribus, which would add further to poverty alleviation. In so far as new agricultural technologies tend 
to have a labour-saving bias, however, maximizing the benefits from agricultural productivity growth 
requires flexible labour markets so that displaced farm workers can find employment readily in non-
farm sectors.    4
Round, including changes needed to the domestic and trade policies of developing 
countries themselves to enhance their food security. 
 
Estimating national and global welfare gains from WTO trade reform 
 
Which sectors and regions offer the largest  potential global gains? 
  What is the potential for welfare gains from the WTO’s Doha Development 
Agenda? This question was addressed in an empirical study (Anderson et al. 2001), 
using an applied general equilibrium model of the global economy known as GTAP.
5 
According to that study, of all the economic gains to be had in 2005 from removing 
the barriers to trade in goods that will still be in place after all Uruguay Round 
commitments are implemented, almost half (48 percent) would come from 
agricultural and processed food policy reform in OECD countries (Table 1) – even 
though such products in those countries contribute only 4 percent of global GDP. But 
notice also that another one-sixth of the welfare gains would come from reform of 
farm and food policies of developing countries.  
Textiles and clothing reforms would be the next largest contributor, although 
they appear small by comparison with agricultural reform: their potential global 
welfare contribution is only one-ninth that of agriculture’s (7 percent compared with 
65 percent). This big difference reflects two facts. One is that projected distortions to 
prices for agriculture are more than twice those for textiles and clothing in 2005. The 
other is that textiles and clothing contribute only 1.5 percent to the value of world 
production and 5 percent to the value of world trade, half or less compared with the 
shares for farm products.
6 
 
                                                 
5 The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model is based in Purdue University (see Hertel 1997). It 
is a standard, multi-region model based on neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition, constant 
returns to scale and full employment. Currently it is in use by several hundred researchers in scores of 
countries on five continents. The data base builds on contributions from many of these individuals, as well 
as the national and international agencies in the GTAP Consortium. 
6 Two assumptions are crucial in generating the results reported in Table 1, however. One is that China 
and Taiwan, having joined the WTO at the end of 2001/start of 2002, enjoy the same accelerated access 
to OECD markets under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) as other 
developing countries that were already WTO members. The other crucial assumption is that OECD 
countries fully implement the spirit of the ATC by the end of 2004, that is, they remove remaining 
import quotas and do not replace them with similarly protective instruments such as safeguard 
measures. Dropping either of those assumptions reduces very substantially the estimated gains from 
Uruguay Round implementation (Anderson et al. 1997), and therefore would raise the potential gains 
from textile and clothing reform in the next and subsequent WTO rounds above that reflected in Table 
1.   5
Which sectors offer the largest potential gains to developing countries as a group? 
The distribution of the gains across regions that would result from full trade 
liberalization is clear from the upper half of Table 1. As always, most of the gains 
accrue to the liberalizing region. For example, all but one-tenth (11.6/122.1) of the 
gains from high-income countries removing distortions to their trade in farm and food 
products accrues to those countries. Even so, that farm trade reform contributes more 
than one-quarter of the total welfare gains to developing countries from developed 
countries liberalizing their merchandise trade (11.6/43.1). As for developing countries 
liberalizing their own farm and food policies, three-quarters of the benefits therefrom 
stay with the developing countries themselves (31.4/42.6), and those policies 
contribute almost half of the gains from those countries' overall merchandise trade 
reform (31.4/65.1). In total, 26 percent (43.0/164.7) of the gains from global 
agricultural trade liberalization would accrue to developing countries.
7 
Clearly, developing countries as a group have a major stake in the process of 
farm policy reform continuing: according to the model results in Table 1, farm and 
food policies globally contribute 40 percent (43.0/108.1) of the cost to developing 
economies of global goods trade distortions. Textile and clothing policies also harm 
them greatly, but barely one-third as much as farm policies.
8 Table 1 shows that 57 
percent (25.6/45.1) of the potential welfare contribution to developing countries from 
global merchandise trade liberalization – and 74 percent (12.3/16.7) of that from just 
farm trade liberalization -- would come from reforms by developing countries 
themselves. This reflects the importance not only of own-country reform but also of 
expanding South-South trade: between the 1980s and 2001, the share of developing 
countries’ agricultural exports going to other developing countries rose from 28 
percent to 37 percent (World Bank 2003, Table 3.6).  
 
What would be the impact of trade reform on international food prices? 
 
The above GTAP modeling study found that full liberalization of OECD farm 
policies would boost the volume of global agricultural trade by more than 50 percent, 
                                                 
7 This compares with an estimate for 2015 of 32 percent in a study that examined just agricultural trade 
reform alone (Beghin, Roland-Holst and Mennsbrugghe 2003). 
8 It should be recognised that these results ignore the effect of tariff preference erosion. In so far as a 
developing country receives such preferences at present in OECD markets, the above results overstate 
the potential gains from their reforms. This point is taken up below.   6
but would cause real international food prices to rise by only 5 percent on average.
9 
For the subset of low-income countries that would remain net food-importing 
economies after such a reform and thereby suffer a deterioration in terms of trade, the 
extent of the rise in their food import prices from a phased and partial reform (as 
distinct from the instantaneous and complete reform modeled above) would be 
indiscernible from other changes in terms of trade due to such things as exchange rate 
movements. Even the complete reform generates estimated losses for only two of the 
food-importing countries/country groups shown in the disaggregated Table 2, namely 
China and Middle East/North Africa.
10 
 
Would rich countries gain more than developing countries from trade reform? 
 
The final two columns of Table 2 reveal that, even though developing 
countries would gain slightly less than rich countries in aggregate dollar terms from a 
move to global free trade in merchandise, they gain much more as a percentage of 
GDP: 1.9 percent, which is more than three times the percentage for rich countries. 
For Sub-Saharan Africa (other than South Africa) the gain would be 1.4 percent of 
GDP. 
Furthermore, those developing countries would gain less if they abstained 
from reforming their own policies. To illustrate the point, the effects on low-income 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia have been examined first without and 
then with those economies participating in reform (Anderson and Yao 2003b). If all 
regions other than South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa were to remove their trade 
distortions remaining after the end of 2004 when all Uruguay Round commitments are 
to have been implemented, the world economy would structurally adjust to allow each 
region to exploit even more its comparative advantages. Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia would have to undertake some structural changes within and between key 
sectors even if they chose not to join in such a trade reform (Table 3(a)). In particular, 
agriculture would expand at the expense of labor-intensive manufacturing in those 
low-income countries. However, Sub-Saharan Africa would expand its agricultural 
                                                 
9 Beghin et al. (2003) estimate a slightly higher price rise for numerous agricultural commodities (but 
close to zero for others), but their study does not include reform to non-farm trade and so overstates 
what the relative price change would be in a multi-sector agreement.  
10 This result from sector-wide multilateral reform is to be contrasted with that from reform of trade 
taxes on a single primary commodity that is grown by a few developing countries and whose demand is 
price-inelastic. In the latter case it is conceivable that the optimal export tax for those few countries is 
greater than zero if they were to cartelize, in which case reform could harm their economies while 
benefiting consumers globally. See, for example, the empirical study of West African cocoa by Gilbert 
and Varangis (2003).   7
output more, and contract its manufacturing more, if it also undertakes reforms itself 
than if it stands aside from reform. The trade balance for the different product groups 
is affected by the above production effects plus changes in consumption, following 
relative price and income changes. By comparing Tables 3(a) and 3(b) it is evident 
that net food imports are less for Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia following the 
removal of remaining trade barriers in 2005, but more so when those developing 
countries participate in the reform.  
 
Would poor African countries gain more from Doha if they abstained from reform? 
 
The results in Anderson and Yao (2003b) suggest Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
aggregate economic welfare gain is twice as great from participating in than from 
standing aside from further trade liberalization. However, most of that greater gain 
goes to the South African Customs Union. The reason that Other Sub-Saharan Africa 
as an aggregate does not gain more is that the very considerable gains from more 
efficient resource use there would be offset by an adverse change in the region’s terms 
of trade when all of those countries expand their primary product exports 
simultaneously.  
That raises the question: Would the economy of each Sub-Saharan African 
country be better off if its government did not participate in the next WTO round? 
The answer is: certainly not. On the contrary, each economy's welfare would be even 
worse if the government did not participate, for several reasons. First, it would forego 
the economic efficiency gains from reforming its own policies while still suffering the 
terms of trade loss from others’ reforms (since any one of those countries is too small 
for its own policy choice to alter the terms of trade significantly).
11 Second, it would 
forego the opportunity to seek through the negotiations greater market access for its 
particular exports to other countries. And third, there is the promise in this next round 
that any participating poor economies that lose from taking part in the multilateral 
liberalization could secure much more compensation than in previous rounds, in the 
form of technical assistance and funds for trade policy capacity building (WTO 
2001b).  
It is thus in the national economic interest of such countries to be pressured 
from abroad to commit to such reform, politically painful though that may be for their 
governments. The political pain tends to be less, and the prospect for a net economic 
                                                 
11 For empirical support for this proposition, see for example Anderson and Strutt (1999) with respect 
to Indonesia. The point is made strongly also in the volume on the Uruguay Round edited by Martin 
and Winters (1996).   8
gain greater, the more sectors the country involves in the reform. The economic gain 
is prospectively greater the more sectors it involves because a wider net reduces the 
possibility that reform is confined to a subset of sectors that are not the most distorted. 
(When so confined, resources might move from the reformed sector to even more 
inefficient uses, thereby reducing rather than improving the efficiency of national 
resource use – see Lloyd 1974.) 
 
Qualifications to the global modeling results 
 
There are three other important sources of gains from trade reform that are not 
captured in the above results, namely, gains from reform of trade in services, gains 
from increasing competition and economies of scale, and dynamic gains.  
The nature of service sector policies makes estimating their effects much more 
difficult than is the case for goods barriers to trade in goods. Nonetheless, preliminary 
empirical attempts suggest restrictions on services trade and investment flows are 
very substantial, particularly by developing countries (Findlay and Warren 2000). 
Moreover, the GATS negotiations during the Uruguay Round resulted in almost no 
commitments to lowering those impediments (Hoekman 1996). During that Round 
many developing countries considered the negotiations that led to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as something they had to put up with in 
order to get agriculture and textiles ‘concessions’. Yet the gains to developing 
countries from opening up their services markets, as for developed countries, would 
be enormous. Those gains would come not just directly to consumers but also to 
producers who purchase services as intermediate inputs into their goods production. 
Farmers in particular would benefit from services reform because they depend heavily 
on such things as transport services to get their produce to domestic and overseas 
markets (Anderson and Hoekman 2000).  
While measuring distortions to services trade and mark-ups by imperfectly 
competitive firms is fraught with difficulty, initial attempts are beginning to bear fruit. 
A study by Francois (2001) includes one set of estimates of the tariff equivalent of 
those distortions in a version of the GTAP model that also incorporates imperfect 
competition and scale economies. Specifically, that study assumes monopolistic 
competition exists in the non-primary sectors involving economies of scale that are 
internal to each firm. These modifications amplify the estimated gains from trade 
considerably. For example, that study finds that if applied tariff rates for both goods 
and services were to be cut in half, the global gains would be US$385 billion, of   9
which 51 percent would be due to services reform. The 49 percent due to halving 
tariffs on goods trade ($192 billion) in the Francois study compares with the above 
estimate (where no imperfect competition is assumed) of around $250 billion from 
totally removing all tariffs on merchandise trade. The key point to draw from this 
comparison is that the gains from trade reported above should be interpreted as lower-
bound estimates for at least two reasons: because they apply only to goods trade, 
leaving aside the important distortions prevalent in services markets; and because they 
are based on the assumption that there are no economies of scale and that perfect 
competition prevails in all sectors. 
None of the studies reported above draws on a truly dynamic economic model. 
They measure well the effects of producers reallocating their resources and consumers 
adjusting their purchases when relative product prices change with trade reform, but 
they do not measure the impact of such reform on investment behavior. Yet we know 
from experience that when markets are freed up, investors divert their funds toward 
expanding the now-more-profitable activities and away from the now-less-profitable 
ones. They are also willing to invest more in aggregate, because of the reduced 
uncertainty associated with binding the reforms in WTO schedules. That boost to 
investment applies even more following the reductions in barriers to foreign 
investment and hence international technology transfers of the past two decades. Thus 
economic growth is boosted by that diversion and expansion of investment funds, 
over and above the boost in output from reallocating existing resource endowments. 
This additional effect is omitted from most empirical modeling efforts for two 
reasons: partly because it takes much longer for analysts to build and to run dynamic 
models than comparative static ones, and partly because the extent to which investors 
respond to changing incentives is less well understood and hence cannot be included 
with as much certainty as the other behavioral characteristics that are common to both 
comparative static and dynamic models. Keeping that in mind, it is nonetheless 
instructive to note the results of a recent study that examines the range of outcomes 
generated as the responsiveness of productivity to openness is varied. 
The World Bank (2002, Ch. 6) conducted a study very similar to the one 
reported above, and obtained very similar results when its version of the GTAP model 
was in comparative static mode (a global welfare gain from complete liberalization of 
merchandise trade of $355 billion per year by 2015, compared with the present 
study’s estimate of $254 billion as early as 2005 when the world economy would be 
somewhat smaller, and with agricultural policies still responsible for about two-thirds   10
of that gain). When their same model was switched into dynamic mode, however, that 
global gain increased two- to three-fold over reasonable ranges of productivity 
responsiveness parameters. This adds further weight to the claim that the earlier 
welfare results should be considered as very much lower-bound estimates of the gains 
from trade liberalization.
12  
  In short, developing countries as a group have much to gain economically 
from taking part in the next round of WTO negotiations to liberalize trade, and more 
so the more they are willing to embrace reform at home so as to enable their firms to 
take greatest advantage of the opportunities provided by the opening up of markets 
abroad. And this applies especially to agricultural trade reform. 
 
Effects of further trade reform on various types of developing countries  
 
  In thinking about the effects that further trade reform could have on 
developing countries, it is helpful to recognize that developing countries are quite 
heterogeneous in their degree of food nutrition and in their production and trade 
specialization patterns. This is evident, for example, in the sample of 23 countries 
included in a recent FAO study on the impact of the Uruguay Round (Mathews 2002). 
Table 4 shows that the proportion of the population that is undernourished is not 
highly correlated with the income grouping of countries. Also clear from the table is 
that not all low-income countries are classified as LDCs (least-developed countries), 
nor is the subset of them that are net importers of food defined on a calorie basis 
highly correlated with the WTO’s list of so-called NFIDCs (net food-importing 
developing countries). And the countries shown vary hugely in the value of their food 
imports when expressed as a percentage of either total exports or just exports of 
agricultural products, with again not a high correlation between those indicators and 
the food-deficit status of countries. Given that heterogeneity, it is helpful for present 
purposes to categorize developing countries as follows: 
•  Net exporters of foods protected by OECD countries (grains, meats, dairy 
products, oilseed products, sugar, fruits and vegetables); 
•  Those sufficiently close to self-sufficient in protected OECD products as to be 
likely net exporters under global free trade; 
                                                 
12 An important caveat to all these studies is they assume the aggregate levels of employment of 
existing resources including labour remain unchanged during the period of adjustment to the reforms. 
In so far as there is some temporary unemployment and some loss of industry-specific human capital, 
those costs would need to be subtracted from the amortised value of the flow of benefits as estimated in 
the simulation studies.    11
•  Those net food importers who would remain so under free trade at home and 
abroad and are net exporters of: 
o  Tropical agricultural products (e.g. beverages) 
o  Non-agricultural primary products (e.g. petroleum) 
o  Non-primary products (e.g. textiles and clothing). 
With those categories in mind, we turn to some of the concerns raised in the paper’s 
introduction. 
 
Does it matter that global trade reform erodes tariff preferences? 
 
Among the net exporters of foods protected by OECD countries are 
developing countries that receive some form of preferential access to OECD country 
markets. Such countries typically have put their negotiating efforts more into seeking 
extensions of preferential trading schemes than into cuts to remaining most-favored-
nation (MFN) barriers to trade in agricultural, textile or other products. While that 
option is currently still before them, it is worth considering whether it is wise to take 
it up.  
There are several types of preferential access schemes that have been designed 
to mitigate the effects of high tariffs on exports from developing countries to 
advanced economies. They range from very broad ones with minor tariff concessions, 
such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), to market-specific ones such as 
the European Union’s provision of duty-free access for certain volumes of certain 
products from certain developing countries (mostly former colonies of EU member 
states) in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP – formerly the Lome 
Convention, now the Cotonou Agreement), to the new EU proposal for duty- and 
quota-free access for most exports from the least developed countries (LDCs, as 
classified by the United Nations). To what extent are these arrangements stepping 
stones or stumbling blocks towards better market access abroad for poor countries? In 
particular, how effective are these arrangements as compared with MFN 
liberalizations under the WTO in delivering benefits to poorer economies (as distinct 
from just being easier politically for national governments to sign)?  
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) developing countries that have been 
granted preferential access to European Union markets for some of their exports 
typically consider themselves privileged, believing that it better enables them to 
compete in those markets. Not only do they not have to pay the same import duty as 
other foreign suppliers, but also they receive the EU domestic price, which is higher   12
than the international price to the extent of the protection afforded by the tariff and 
other restrictions such as quotas on non-ACP imports. 
Beneficial though this might sound, five important points need to be borne in 
mind. First, many other equally poor but non-ACP developing countries are harmed 
by the ACP preferences. This was made abundantly clear in the 1990s during the 
infamous dispute-settlement case that was brought to the WTO concerning the EU’s 
banana import regime. One background study showed that for every dollar of benefit 
that the banana policy brought to producers in ACP countries, the regime harmed non-
ACP developing country producers by almost exactly one dollar – and in the process 
harmed EU consumers by more than thirteen dollars (Borrell 1999a). It is difficult to 
imagine a more inefficient way of transferring welfare to poor countries, since EU 
citizens could have, through direct payments, been 13 times as effective in helping 
ACP banana producers and not hurt non-ACP banana producers at all. Such wasteful 
trade diversion is avoided under non-discriminatory, most-favored-nation (MFN) 
liberalizations that result from multilateral trade negotiations under WTO. 
Second, the additional production that is encouraged in those ACP countries 
when they get privileged access to the high-priced EU market is not internationally 
competitive at current prices (otherwise it would have been produced prior to getting 
that preferential treatment). Indeed the industry as a whole may not have existed in 
the ACP country had the preference scheme not been introduced.
13 In that case, its 
profits are likely to be lean despite the scheme, and would disappear if and when the 
scheme is dismantled. Efforts to learn the skills needed, and the sunk capital invested 
in that industry rather than in ones in which the country has a natural comparative 
advantage, would then earn no further rewards. 
Third, the ACP preferential access scheme under the Lome Convention has 
not been a reciprocal agreement, that is, the developing countries were not required to 
open their markets to EU products. While that makes life easy for ACP politicians, it 
contributes nothing to the removal of the wasteful trade-restrictive policies of the 
ACP countries. This contrasts with market access negotiations under WTO, which are 
characterized by reciprocity: you receive greater access to my markets (on an MFN 
basis) on the condition that your trading partner receives a similar degree of 
improvement in access to your markets.  
                                                 
13 Alternatively, the ACP scheme may have caused an existing industry to become less competitive. An 
extreme example of an industry that has ossified as a consequence of regulations introduced to share 
the expected benefits of EU preferences is sugar in Mauritius (Borrell 1999b).   13
Fourth, in so far as a developing country sells only part of its exports into a 
protected market to which it has preferential access, it receives a lower price for the 
rest of its exports than would be the case under free trade because of the price-
depressing effect of that OECD protection on the free international market. It is 
therefore conceivable that the weighted average price for its exports is lower than 
what it would be under free trade, notwithstanding the benefit of preferential access 
for some of its exports. 
Fifth and perhaps most importantly, the ACP preference scheme reduces very 
substantially the capacity for developing countries as a group to press for more access 
to EU markets. It does this in two ways: by reducing the number of such countries 
arguing against protection, and by creating a subset of developing countries 
supporting the EU’s protectionist stance (in order to continue to receive the high 
domestic prices in the EU market). This point is crucial, and yet it is often not 
appreciated. Perhaps if these preferences had not been offered in the first place, 
developing countries would have negotiated much more vigorously in previous GATT 
rounds for lower tariffs on agricultural and other imports into the EU. That in turn 
would have placed greater pressure on Japan and others to reduce their agricultural 
protectionism also. The end result would have been higher international prices for 
agricultural products that, for developing country producers as a group, may have 
been more than sufficient to offset the lower prices received in the EU market for a  
favored subset of those producers. 
A similar set of provisos can be made about the EU’s recent proposal to 
extend preferences for UN-designated ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs). That 
initiative would provide duty- and quota-free access to the EU for exports of all 
merchandise except arms. It received in-principle, best-endeavors endorsement at the 
WTO Ministerial in Doha in November 2001, but without any specific timetable.
14 
Liberal though that proposal sounds, note that it does not include trade in 
services (of which the most important for LDCs would be movement of natural 
persons, that is, freedom for LDC laborers to work in the EU or other high-wage 
countries).
15 Also, a number of safeguard provisions are included in addition to the 
EU’s normal anti-dumping measures. Furthermore, access to three politically 
                                                 
14 In Paragraph 42 of the Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2001b) it simply says: “We commit ourselves 
to the objective of duty-free, quota-free market access for products originating from LDCs.” 
15 On the potential gains from freeing the temporary movement of unskilled labour services globally, 
see Winters, Walmsley, Wang and Grynberg (2003).   14
sensitive agricultural markets, bananas, rice and sugar, would be phased in by the EU 
only gradually over the next eight years (and would be subject to stricter safeguards).  
Several empirical studies of the proposal have already appeared. A World 
Bank study by Ianchovichina, Mattoo and Olarreaga (2001) compares the EU 
proposal, from the viewpoint of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with recent initiatives of 
the United States and Japan. Their GTAP modeling results suggest that even the most 
generous interpretation of the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (which they 
model as unrestricted access to the US for all SSA exports) would benefit SSA very 
little because the US economy is already very open and, in the products where it is not 
(e.g. textiles and clothing), SSA countries have little comparative advantage. Likewise 
they find the Japanese proposal of free access to Japan’s market for industrial 
products helps SSA hardly at all, since the region exports few industrial products. By 
contrast, the EU proposal, especially if it were to apply to all Quad countries (the EU, 
the US, Canada and Japan), would have a sizeable effect on SSA trade and welfare – 
provided agriculture is included in the deal. Just from EU access alone, SSA exports 
would be raised by more than US$0.5 billion and SSA economic welfare would 
increase by $0.3 billion per year (a 0.2 percent boost). This is very similar to a recent 
estimate by UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 3).  
The estimated benefits are not surprising given that agriculture and food 
products account for more than half SSA exports. These items are highly protected in 
the EU and other Quad countries, and little is provided for them in the way of 
preferential access under the GSP. The results overstate the benefits of the EU 
proposal, however, as this World Bank study assumes all SSA countries (excluding 
relatively wealthy South Africa and Mauritius), not just the LDCs amongst them, 
would get duty- and quota-free access. 
Another World Bank study, by Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2002), uses a 
partial equilibrium approach and looks at the benefit of the EU initiative for LCDs not 
just in SSA but globally. It finds that trade of LDCs would increase by US$2.5 billion 
per year if all Quad countries provided them duty- and quota-free access on all 
merchandise.
16 However, almost half of that increase would come as a result of trade 
diversion from other developing countries. The authors suggest this is trivial because 
it represents less than 0.1 percent of other developing countries’ exports (about $1.1 
                                                 
16 This and other estimates of gains from preferential market access provisions need to discounted to 
the extent that rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary barriers, anti-dumping duties and the like limit 
the actual trade allowed. For a detailed analysis of these types of restrictions on EU imports from 
Bangladesh in recent years, see UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 5).   15
billion).
17 That misses a similar point to the one made above, however. It is that if the 
48 LDCs are given such preferences, they will become advocates for rather than 
against the continuation of MFN tariff peaks for agriculture and textiles – diminishing 
considerably the number of WTO members negotiating for their reduction. It may be 
true that reductions in agricultural and textile tariffs would help LDCs much less than 
they would help other developing countries, as the study by Hoekman, Ng and 
Olarreaga (2002) finds; but the gains to consumers in the Quad would be more than 
sufficient to allow them to increase their aid to LDCs to compensate for the loss of 
income from preference erosion. To put the point in a blunter but more general way, 
trade can be worse than direct aid if the trade is preferential and thereby distortionary. 
 
Wouldn’t net food-importing developing countries lose from higher food import bills? 
Among the net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), some fear 
agricultural protection cuts by OECD countries will lead to an unaffordably higher 
international food import bill. Yet even those developing countries – which may be 
part of one of the country aggregates in Table 2 – need not lose out from farm support 
cuts abroad. If, for example, they are close to self-sufficient in food without price 
supports (as many net food-importing developing countries are), and reform abroad 
raises the international price of food, they may switch to become sufficiently export-
oriented that their net national economic welfare rises. A second possibility is that the 
developing country's own policies are sufficiently biased against food production that 
the country is a net importer, despite having a comparative advantage in food. In that 
case, the international price rise can improve national economic welfare even if the 
price change is insufficient to turn that distorted economy into a net food exporter. 
That comes about because the higher price of food attracts mobile resources away 
from more-distorted sectors, thereby improving the efficiency of national resource 
allocation. Because of these two possibilities, the number of poor countries for which 
a rise in international food prices might cause some hardship is much smaller than the 
number that are currently not net exporters of agricultural products. Indeed, using a 
partial equilibrium model of the world’s food markets, Anderson and Tyers (1993) 
find that all food-importing developing country regions (excluding East Asia’s newly 
industrialized economies) would have gained in the early 1990s from OECD 
                                                 
17 The impact outside the LDC group would be far from trivial for Mauritius, however, since the vast 
bulk of its exports are quota-restricted sales of clothing and sugar to the EU and US. See the discussion 
in UNCTAD/Commonwealth Secretariat (2001, Ch. 6).   16
agricultural trade and subsidy reform, and none would have ended up with an 
increased food import bill. 
What about each of the NFIDCs within those regions? Some are exporters of 
tropical agricultural products such as beverages, while others export energy raw 
materials or other mining products. They would be less concerned about a higher food 
import bill if they received in return better access to OECD markets for more-
processed versions of their primary products. Tariff escalation in many instances 
makes access difficult through raising the effective protection to processors in OECD 
countries, which crowd out potential exports from developing country processors. 
What about those developing countries whose comparative advantage is 
gradually moving from primary products to (initially unskilled) labor-intensive 
manufactures, as in much of Asia? While industrialization lowers their direct interest 
in agricultural trade reform abroad, it heightens their keenness to see barriers to 
exports of textiles and clothing lowered. Their interest in textile trade expansion 
should be shared by agricultural-exporting developing countries, for if the former 
group could export more manufactures, it would tend to become a larger net importer 
of agricultural products. Conversely, lowered industrial-country barriers to 
agricultural trade would reduce the need for the more land-abundant developing 
countries to move into manufactures in competition with the newly industrializing 
ones. Scope clearly exists for the two groups to band together and negotiate as a 
single voice calling for barriers to both farm and textile trade to be lowered, so that 
each group can better exploit its comparative advantage to the direct benefit of the 
vast majority of poor people in both. If that means lowering protected domestic food 
prices, some farm laborers will find jobs in the expanding light industrial sector where 
wages will have risen. Even those staying in agriculture need not lose, if savings from 
cuts in price supports were used to reduce under-investment in such areas as 
agricultural R&D and rural roads, education and health. 
 
Effects of further reform on different households within developing countries  
 
Another important distinction is that between various types of households 
within each developing country. For present purposes the key household types to 
distinguish are net sellers of food, landless farm laborers, and non-farm low-skilled 
laborers (including underemployed workers). Those households mainly supplying 
non-farm skilled labor and/or capital typically are not poor and so are of less concern   17
here. Bearing this in mind, we turn to two additional questions raised in the 
introduction. 
 
Wouldn’t higher international food prices increase poverty and food insecurity for 
poor households? 
The impact of trade liberalization on income distribution and thereby on 
poverty at the household level is not always clear: even though the effects of trade 
policies on capital owners and workers have been studied by trade theorists for 
centuries, applying that theory to the real world turns out to be a complex empirical 
task (Winters 2002; McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 2001; Hoekman et al. 2001). This 
is because the economy-wide effects depend (a) on the shares of households’ income 
from different productive factors such as labor and land, whose prices will have 
changed (depending on the size of the changes in relative producer prices, factor 
substitutability, factor intensities, and factor mobility between sectors), (b) on their 
expenditure shares on different products (whose consumer prices also will have 
changed and not necessarily to the same extent as producer prices not least because of 
marketing margins), and (c) on any changes in net transfers to them (e.g. increased 
handouts, decreased taxation, more remittances from urban relatives). Those 
complexities make it difficult to generalize a priori, or even in the face of empirical 
modeling studies when they report effects of reform just on production, trade, product 
prices and aggregate economic welfare. Even so, some observations are worth making 
about the effects on poverty and food security of reducing agricultural protectionism 
globally. 
Most low-income countries have not propped up the producer price of food. In 
so far as an international food price rise is transmitted domestically,
18 the vast 
majority of the poor would benefit directly. This is because they are in farm 
households and are net sellers of food. Even poor landless farm laborers who are net 
buyers of food would benefit indirectly from agricultural trade liberalization via a rise 
in the demand for their unskilled farm labor, assuming that raises their wage sufficient 
to more than offset the rise in food prices in rural areas. Since the more affluent 
people in cities would find it relatively easy to pay a little extra for food, the only 
other major vulnerable group is the under-employed urban poor. But even that group 
                                                 
18 The elasticity of price transmission is usually less than one for importing countries, especially in the 
short run where governments intervene at the border in an attempt to cushion the domestic market from 
international price fluctuations (Tyers and Anderson 1992, Sharma 2003). And it is typically much 
lower in remote rural locations than in urban settings close to the nation’s border.    18
may not be worse off in so far as trade reform generates a more-than-offsetting 
increase in the demand for (often informal sector) services that use that group’s labor 
relatively intensively. 
  What about the impact of reform on food price variability and other aspects of 
food security, especially as it affects the poorest households? Contrary to popular 
belief, trade liberalization is much more likely to reduce than raise food insecurity for 
the vast majority of the world’s poor. Food security means always having access to 
the minimum supply of basic food necessary for survival. The key to that, in addition 
to peace and greater efficiency in the functioning of staple food markets, is 
strengthened purchasing power of the poor. That is, enhancing food security is mainly 
about alleviating poverty. The rate of food self-sufficiency is at most only a 
supplementary indicator, and only while there remains a perception that food 
insecurity rises when the level of food self-sufficiency in basic foods falls much 
below 100 percent. 
Eliminating all agricultural policy distortions in developed countries would 
raise international prices for agricultural products on average, and reduce their 
variance by ‘thickening’ the market, which would stimulate production in non-
protected countries.
19 According to one recent study (Diao, Somwaru and Roe 2001), 
that would boost the value of agricultural exports of developing countries by 24 
percent and dampen their agricultural imports by 2 percent. That suggests food self-
sufficiency in many low-income countries would rise. As well, since a high 
proportion of the poorest households in developing countries are producers and net 
sellers of food, they would benefit from such reform. In both respects, therefore, food 
security for the vast majority of households in low-income countries should be 
enhanced on average. Those same households would be helped even further if 
agricultural price-depressing policies were in place domestically and these are 
removed. The latter reform also boosts self-sufficiency in agricultural products and 
thereby boosts even further perceived food security in those economies.  
The Diao, Somwaru and Roe (2001) study estimates that eliminating 
developing countries’ own agricultural price distortions would boost their farm export 
value by a further 6 percent. True, the households that are net buyers of food in such 
economies will face higher food prices; but whether they become less food secure 
                                                 
19 Unfortunately ‘dirty’ tariffication and the continuing use of specific tariffs by developed countries, 
the setting of high ceiling bindings by developing countries, and the introduction of tariff rate quotas 
greatly weakened (relative to pure ad valorem tariffication) the extent to which the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture raised the mean and lowered the variance of international food prices during 
the past seven years.    19
depends also on what happens to their earnings (and/or transfers). If they are landless 
rural poor, their earning prospects will have risen along with the growth in demand 
for farm labor, or for labor in local enterprises that grow as farmers spend their 
enhanced income on simple manufactures and services made nearby. As for urban 
households, the vast majority of them are more affluent than those in rural households 
and so can well afford to pay higher market prices for food. This suggests only a 
small proportion of households in low-income economies would be net food buyers at 
risk of becoming more food-insecure as a result of rising domestic food prices 
following trade liberalization. Even that group could be better off if developed 
countries were to reduce also their barriers to imports of textiles and clothing, since 
that would expand the demand for unskilled labor in the apparel industry of 
developing countries. 
What about in developing countries where agricultural trade liberalization 
means lower domestic prices for agricultural products because such countries have 
kept domestic food prices above international levels via import restrictions? It is true 
that removing those distortions will reduce farm incomes in those countries (but by 
more for larger than smaller farms), and urban households will benefit from lower 
food prices. However, food self-sufficiency will fall – and it is the fall in both farm 
earnings and food self-sufficiency that focuses the attention of those who argue that 
agricultural trade liberalization is bad for poor households. Focusing on just the direct 
effects of agricultural trade policy reform can be misleading, however, not least 
because it does not take account of the fact that such reform is typically done in the 
context of multilateral, economy-wide liberalization. Being multilateral means that 
other countries’ farm protection cuts raise international food prices, and so less of a 
price fall occurs than when a country cuts it agricultural protection unilaterally. And 
being economy-wide means the decline in demand for farm labor is more or less than 
offset by a growth in demand for labor in expanding non-farm industries.  
In short, at least two points are worth stressing.
20 First, reducing agricultural 
policy distortions in developed countries would increase the mean and decrease the 
variance of international prices for agricultural products, which would stimulate 
production in other countries. That suggests food self-sufficiency would rise in those 
developing countries that transmit international prices to their domestic market. 
Second, since a high proportion of the poorest households in low-income countries 
                                                 
20 For a more in-depth analysis of the food security aspects of WTO farm trade reform, see Diaz-
Bonilla, Thomas and Robinson (2003).   20
are producers and net sellers of food, they would be key beneficiaries of such reform. 
In both respects, therefore, food security for the vast majority of households in low-
income countries should be enhanced on average. Those same households would be 
helped even further by the reduction/removal of any policies that are depressing 
farmers returns (e.g., directly via agricultural export taxes or indirectly via import 
protection for non-agricultural sectors or an over-valued currency). The latter reform 
also boosts self-sufficiency in agricultural products and thereby boosts perceived food 
security even further in those economies.  
 
What about lowering domestic food prices in protective developing countries, as with 
China’s accession to WTO? 
  Those food-importing developing countries that currently protect their farmers 
have a different set of concerns. The case of China’s accession to WTO illustrates the 
situation. That accession, which will be on-going until the latter part of the present 
decade, involves a decline in the domestic price of some farm products. Because farm 
households in China are among the country’s poorest, that trade reform is often 
pointed to as an example of one that will exacerbate poverty. To explore that 
possibility, a set of empirical studies was commissioned recently by the World Bank. 
A global economy-wide numerical simulation model was used to generate the 
changes in product and factor prices expected from the commitments to reform that 
China made in its accession negotiations. These were then mapped to the earning and 
spending patterns of various household types and regions in China as revealed in 
China’s rural and urban household surveys.  
The conventional wisdom that China’s WTO accession will impoverish its 
rural people, via greater import competition in its agricultural markets, need not 
prevail. One needs to keep in mind that, even if prices of some (land-intensive) farm 
products fall, those for other (labor-intensive) farm products could rise. Also, the 
removal of restrictions on China’s exports of textiles and clothing will boost town and 
village enterprises, so demand for non-farm workers in rural areas may grow even if 
demand for farm labor in aggregate falls.  
New estimates of the likely changes in agricultural prices as a result of WTO 
accession are drawn on to examine the factor reward implications of China’s WTO 
accession empirically using the GTAP model. Results reported in Anderson, 
Ianchovichina and Huang (2004) suggest farm-nonfarm and Western-Eastern income 
inequality may well rise but rural-urban income inequality need not. That conclusion   21
is supported by a more-detailed study of households by Chen and Ravallion (2004). 
They find negligible impacts on inequality and a small reduction in poverty in 
aggregate, but some variance across households and regions. Farm households tend to 
lose, especially those highly dependent on feed grain production (in Northeastern 
China) and in hinterland regions with weak links to the booming non-farm sectors and 
eastern provinces. But the losses are at most very small, amounting to less than 5 
percent of household income. Facilitating the transfer of some labor from less-
lucrative farm activities to now-more-lucrative non-farm work could be sufficient 
(with the usual remittances back to the farm household) to ensure all gain from 
China’s WTO accession.  
A companion study by Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) also examines how 
much difference it could make if the hukou system that restricts rural-to-urban 
migration were to be abolished. Their results suggest that the sign of the effects could 
be switched to favor the poorer farm households – albeit at the expense of the richer 
non-farm ones – if the remaining WTO accession-related reforms were to be 
accompanied by reform of the hukou system that allowed some members of those 
households to obtain higher-paying non-farm employment and repatriate earnings 
back to their farm family. And of course aggregate national economic welfare would 
be enhanced by that labor market reform as well. This illustrates the general point that 
gains from trade reform will be greater, the more liberal are domestic product and 
factor markets. 
A summary of those modeling results can be seen in Table 5. Without labor 
market reform, WTO accession for China would slightly reduce rewards to unskilled 
farm labor and to agricultural land while raising rewards to all other factors of 
production. That suggests farm households earning less than 60 percent of their 
income from unskilled nonfarm work could be harmed (albeit only slightly) from 
WTO accession. If complete abolition of restrictions to off-farm migration 
accompanied WTO accession reforms, however, the final column of Table 5 suggests 
all types of farm households could be better off as more family members are attracted 
to higher-paying off-farm work.  
  In so far as China’s WTO accession puts upward pressure on international 
farm product prices, that would have the same pro-poor consequences in other 
developing countries as the multilateral farm trade reform discussed above. However, 
the extent of that price rise and the associated increase in China’s imports of farm 
products is going to be minor, and certainly will not, as implied by the title of Lester   22
Brown’s 1995 book, ‘starve the world’ (see the empirical results in Anderson et al. 
1997). 
 
What are the risks of re-instrumentation of agricultural protection? 
 
  If increasing market access in OECD countries through reducing farm 
production and export subsidies and agricultural protection is able to contribute to 
poverty alleviation in developing countries, then to what extent would that objective 
be compromised by efforts to substitute new forms of assistance to farmers as 
traditional protective instruments are phased out? The imposition of tariff rate quotas 
accompanied by very high out-of-quota tariffs, and the administration of quotas so as 
to ensure less than full usage of them, were two ways in which agricultural protection 
changes following the Uruguay Round were minimized – to the point that many 
developing countries struggled to identify any significant growth in agricultural 
export earnings resulting from the UR Agreement on Agriculture (Mathews 2002).
21 
There are at least two ways in which cuts in assistance to developed country 
farmers may be minimized following the Doha Round too. One is via an expansion of 
exempt support measures to satisfy so-called non-trade concerns related to the alleged 
‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture – even though those concerns can readily be met 
much more directly and hence in less trade-distorting ways than is being proposed 
(Anderson 2000; Paarlberg, Bredahl and Lee 2002). While the multifunctionality 
concept originated in the richest, most-protective economies, it is now being 
embraced by farmer groups in numerous developing countries as well. More than 20 
such countries’ farm groups plus the EU met in Geneva 23-25 October 2002 and 
signed a declaration calling on WTO members to acknowledge that “agriculture 
cannot be treated in the same way as industrial sectors” because farming “fulfils a 
multitude of functions …” Since then, however, some developing countries have been 
at pains to stress that their concerns are very different from those emphasized by rich 
countries. 
The other likely form of re-instrumentation is via the adoption of stricter 
standards that then act as technical barriers to trade. Quarantine measures are an 
obvious case in point. They often add relatively large cost burdens to exporters from 
poorer countries because those countries do not have the same capability as developed 
                                                 
21 There may have been some as-yet-unmeasured benefits to the extent developing countries were 
granted the rents from TRQs imposed by developed countries (which would make their effects similar 
to the VERs imposed on textile exports from developing countries).   23
countries to meet high standards, nor the same imperative to impose them to satisfy 
domestic consumers (Wilson 2002).
22 Numerous developing countries have cited 
examples of SPS measures of OECD countries that are already significantly hindering 
their exports (Matthews 2002). Another is the increasing use of geographical 
indications and traditional expressions aimed at differentiating rich-country products, 
which effectively reduces the demand for more-standard substitute products from 
other countries.
23 A third and less-obvious possibility is the restriction of imports of 
food products containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The direct, short-
term effects of a ban on GMOs could help exports from developing countries that 
choose not to adopt GMOs, even though it harms those who have already adopted 
GMOs (Nielsen and Anderson 2001; Anderson and Yao 2003a; Anderson and 
Jackson 2003). But the indirect, longer-term, and potentially much larger effects are 
adverse for the world’s poor, namely, the disincentive effect of such restrictions on 
investment in agricultural biotechnologies that could lower food prices and/or raise 
the nutritional attributes of foods available in developing countries (not to mention the 
potential damage a GMO trade dispute could inflict on the global trading system – see 




How can the prospects for and benefits from reform be maximized? 
 
Consumers in developed countries are more concerned with food safety and 
the environment than with the price-raising effect of agricultural protection. They are 
therefore not a force for reform except perhaps for switching support to payments tied 
to better environmental or food safety outcomes. So the political force for agricultural 
(and textiles and clothing) reform in developed countries has to come from those 
countries’ exporters of other industrial goods and of services. That requires 
developing countries providing increased access to those producers’ exports as a quid 
pro quo. Such reform would provide additional benefits to the farm sector of poor 
countries, both directly through lower-cost inputs and indirectly through the currency 
devaluation that would accompany it. While the farm sector is typically a weak 
                                                 
22 Quarantine barriers are also more costly than equivalently trade-restrictive import tariffs or quotas 
for the imposing countries, since the latter generate tariff revenue or quota rents whereas for the former 
that revenue is absorbed in costs of compliance. 
23 See, for example, the concerns raised by Cairns Group members in WTO (2001c). An analysis of the 
prospects for producers in developing countries also harnessing geographical indications as a 
marketing tool is provided in Maskus (2003).   24
lobbying force in poor countries, membership in or association with a coalition such 
as the Cairns Group could enhance its lobbying skills.
24 So too could support from the 
more-enlightened non-government development agencies that realize how damaging 
OECD farm policies are to sustainable development in poorer countries (see, e.g., 
Oxfam 2002).  
As mentioned above, textile and clothing exporters have an indirect interest in 
seeing agricultural protection reductions in their own country as well as in the OECD, 
so that potential food-exporting countries can access those markets instead of 
competing with them by turning to manufacturing. An alliance between those two 
types of developing countries would allow them to jointly push for greater agricultural 
and textile market access in rich countries.  
People in developing countries also need to recognize that while so-called 
special and differential treatment (such as slower reform for developing countries, as 
in the Harbinson proposal for the Doha round) may be what their governments prefer 
for political reasons, it is not in the economic interests of developing country citizens. 
Faster and larger reforms bestow greater national economic gains from trade 
liberalization.  
To maximize the gains from trade reform, however, developing countries need 
to have well-functioning domestic economies. If factor markets are inflexible, or 
public infrastructures are in poor shape, only a fraction (and possibly a small fraction) 
of the potential gains from trade reform will be realized. 
 
How best to deal with residual concerns about food security? 
 
If a society would feel too food-insecure under laissez faire, then what needs 
to be determined is a sense of (a) its willingness to pay for more security by various 
means, and (b) the costs of those insurance measures. One such measure involves 
encouraging the holding of food stocks above those that would be commercially 
viable -- a public good that is explicitly allowed for in Annex 2 of the WTO's 
Agreement on Agriculture. The optimal level of encouragement is that which boosts 
stocks so that the marginal social benefit in terms of food security equals the marginal 
                                                 
24 Within agriculture, developing countries’ interests in Doha agenda items align closely with those of 
the Cairns Group of non-subsidizing agricultural-exporting countries (Bjornskov and Lind 2002). See 
Cairns Group (2002) for its proposal on market access in the Doha Round. To many people’s surprise a 
group of 20+ developing countries led by Brazil, China and India did coalesce at the Trade Ministerial 
meeting of WTO members in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003 and effectively brought the meeting 
to a close by demanding more agricultural reform in OECD countries than the EU and US were willing 
to offer at the time.   25
social cost of that intervention. Costs are non-trivial, however. Storage and interest 
costs and the costs of spoilage and quality deterioration can amount to more than 20 
percent a year. The cost part of the calculation also would need to include the risk of 
government failure if stocks were to be managed by an inefficient (or corrupt) public 
agency.  
If greater domestic production capability was considered by society to be one 
of the desirable means of boosting food security (because of a perception that food 
import dependence is too unreliable), there are far less costly ways of achieving that 
than via farm product price supports and import protection. For example, boosting 
production alone, rather than also taxing consumption as with an import barrier, 
would be a lower-cost and less-trade-distorting means of achieving that end. Even 
more effective could be improvements in land tenure and more investment in the 
stocks of primary factors used in food production: agricultural research,
25 rural human 
capital, and rural infrastructure (Otsuka 2002). Such efforts would provide an 
especially high payoff in situations where, as in so many countries, there has been 
gross under-investment in these activities in the past. Simultaneously, production 
could be boosted in many low-income countries simply by better clarifying and 
enforcing land rights, since they are a key source of collateral for securing loans for 
productive investments by farm households. 
Where targeted programs to boost the earning capacity of the poverty-stricken 
(e.g. via basic education/training) are still not enough to boost food security in the 
short term, targeted consumer subsidies to provide that core group with food staples 
are much less costly than general subsidies to all food consumers via price-depressing 
agricultural policies. Food aid that is targeted to just that group could be readily 
provided by the international community without depressing very much the prices 
received by farmers in recipient countries.
26 And greater technical and economic 
cooperation in the areas of agricultural research, rural education and health, and rural 
infrastructure may be important co-requisites of trade policy reform if developing 
countries are to be convinced that they would gain unequivocally from the Doha 
round. 
                                                 
25 For recent reviews of the substantial contribution that a further boost to agricultural research could 
do for poverty alleviation in low-income countries, see Hazell and Haddad (2001) and Runge et al. 
(2003). 
26 If such subsidies are only paid in the towns and cities, however, this increases the risk of excessive, 
socially costly migration out of agriculture as analysed by Harris and Todaro (1970).   26
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Geneva: World Trade Organization, 29 June. Table 1: Sectoral and regional contributions to economic welfare gains
a from 
completely removing trade barriers globally, post-Uruguay Round, 2005 
 
(a) in 1995 US$ billions 
 







and Food Primary Clothing Manufactures 
High Income   
   High Income  110.5 -0.0 -5.7 -8.1 96.6
 Low Income  11.6 0.1 9.0 22.3 43.1
 Total  122.1 0.0 3.3 14.2 139.7
Low Income   
 High Income  11.2 0.2 10.5 27.7 49.6
 Low Income  31.4 2.5 3.6 27.6 65.1
 Total  42.6 2.7 14.1 55.3 114.7
All Countries   
 High Income  121.7 0.1 4.8 19.6 146.2
 Low Income  43.0 2.7 12.6 49.9 108.1
 Total  164.7 2.8 17.4 69.5 254.3
 
(b) in percent of total global gains 
 
Liberalizing   Agriculture Other Textiles & Other  Total
Region:  Benefiting 
region 
and Food Primary Clothing Manufactures 
High Income   
   High Income  43.4 0.0 -2.3 -3.2 38.0
 Low Income  4.6 0.1 3.5 8.8 16.9
 Total  48.0 0.0 1.3 5.6 54.9
Low Income   
 High Income  4.4 0.1 4.1 10.9 19.5
 Low Income  12.3 1.0 1.4 10.9 25.6
 Total  16.7 1.1 5.5 21.7 45.1
All Countries   
 High Income  47.9 0.1 1.9 7.7 57.5
 Low Income  16.9 1.0 4.9 19.6 42.5
 Total  64.8 1.1 6.8 27.3 100.0
 
a No account is taken in these calculations of the welfare effects of environmental 
changes associated with trade liberalization, which could be positive or negative 
depending in part on how environmental policies are adjusted following trade 
reforms.  
 
b High and low income here are short-hand for developed and developing countries. 
 
Source: Anderson et al. (2001). Table 2: Disaggregation of sectoral and regional contributions to economic welfare gains
a from completely removing trade barriers globally, 
post-Uruguay Round, 2005 
(1995 US$billion) 
  Rich country liberalization  Developing country liberalization Global liberalization
  Total  Agric.   Manuf. Total  Agric.  Manuf.  All merchandise 
 $bil $bil $bil $bil $bil $bil $bil % of GDP
North America  3 11 -9 19 9 11 22 0.2
Western Europe  50 61 -11 21 2 19 71 0.7
Australia/New Zealand  8 8 -1 2 1 1 10 2
Japan 36 30 6 8 0 8 44 0.8
China 5 -5 10 -11 -4 -7 -6 -0.4
HKong, Korea, Taiwán  4 1 6 24 12 12 28 2.3
Indonesia 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.9
Other Southeast Asia  0 -1 1 10 6 5 11 2.6
India 4 1 3 5 2 3 9 1.8
Other South Asia  1 0 1 5 3 2 7 4.6
Brazil 3 1 2 13 5 9 16 2
Other Latin America  15 14 1 4 3 2 19 2.4
Turkey 0 -1 1 2 1 1 2 0.9
Middle East & N. Africa  -1 -3 2 -1 0 0 -2 -0.2
Economies in Transition  4 1 3 2 2 0 6 0.7
South African CU  1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.9
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  2 2 0 1 1 0 3 1.4
Rest of world  4 3 1 7 3 4 11 3
Low income  43 12 31 65 34 31 108 1.9
High income  97 110 -14 50 11 38 146 0.6
Total 140 122 17 115 45 69 254 0.8
 
Source: Anderson et al. (2001). Table 3: Percentage difference in sectoral output when all merchandise trade 
distortions remaining post-Uruguay Round are removed, 2005 












1 12 9 
W h e a t  1 8266  
OtherCerealGrain 114 85 1 1 
V e g F r u i t N u t s  1011  
OilSeeds 2 3 -1 2 
OthCrops 43 -8 -2 1 
PlantFibre -12 11 -2 0 
Livestocks 28 15 0 1 
OthFoodProd 28 2 -2 29 
MeatDairyPrd 38 14 1 3 
F o r e s t r y F i s h  2001  
E n e r g M i n e r a l  - 2012  
VegOilsFats 0 0 -4 -5 
TextilesClothing -8 -2 -10 -16 
OtherManuf -7 0 3 11 
S e r v i c e s  0000  
 











-1 19 18 
Wheat -3 -6 15 7 
OtherCerealGrain 171 90 1 2 
VegFruitNuts 1 9 0 -3 
OilSeeds -5 -1 0 7 
OthCrops 61 9 -2 -4 
P l a n t F i b r e  - 1 0- 1- 2- 1  
Livestocks -6 54 0 6 
OthFoodProd 22 3 1 38 
M e a t D a i r y P r d  - 6028  
F o r e s t r y F i s h  7403  
E n e r g M i n e r a l  2 9763  
VegOilsFats 0 2 -15 -17 
TextilesClothing 1 -13 5 29 
OtherManuf -8 -5 19 60 
S e r v i c e s  1024  
 
Source: Anderson and Yao (2003b).   3
Table 4: Income category and food trade status of a sample of developing countries. 
 
 



















Bangladesh 35  LI LDC LIFDC 21  829
Botswana 25  UMI NFIDC 14  256
Brazil 10  UMI 7  30
Costa Rica  5  UMI 6  19
Côte d’Ivoire  15  LI NFIDC LIFDC 9  17
Egypt 4  LMI NFIDC LIFDC 20  542
Fiji na  LMI 9  52
Guyana na  LMI 7  23
Honduras 21  LMI NFIDC LIFDC 13  48
India 24  LI LIFDC 5  42
Indonesia 6  LI LIFDC 6  56
Jamaica 9  LMI NFIDC 12  111
Kenya 44  LI NFIDC LIFDC 13  32
Malawi 33  LI LDC LIFDC 13  16
Morocco 7  LMI NFIDC LIFDC 12  146
Pakistan 19  LI NFIDC LIFDC 15  134
Peru 11  LMI NFIDC 14  152
Philippines 23  LMI LIFDC 6  123
Senegal 25  LI LDC LIFDC 26  357
Sri Lanka  23  LMI NFIDC LIFDC 12  68
Thailand 18  LMI 2  14
Uganda 21  LI LDC LIFDC 20  41
Zimbabwe 38 LI 5  13
 
Note: LI, LMI and UMI refer to the World Bank classifications of low-income, lower 
middle-income and upper middle-income countries; LDCs are least-developed 
countries, as recognized by the UN; LIFDCs are low-income food-deficit countries, 
defined by FAO as those countries with a GNP per capita less than $1,445 in 2000 
and which are net importers of food defined on a calorie basis; NFIDCs are net food-
importing developing countries, as defined by the WTO Committee on Agriculture. 
 
Source: Compiled from data in Mathews (2002) and the FAO’s State of Food 
Insecurity 2002, Rome.   4
Table 5: Changes in China’s real factor prices and national economic welfare 
due to its WTO accession, 2001 to 2007 
 




Factor rewards:   
Alternative scenario: core 
case plus also removing 
labor market distortion 
 
Farm unskilled wages  -0.7  16.8 
Rental price of land  -5.5  -9.7 
Nonfarm unskilled wages  1.2  -3.8 
Skilled labor wages  0.8  -1.7 
Rental price of capital  1.3  -1.4 
 
Farm household income
a:    
Farm household type-A  -1.6  6.8 
Farm household type-B  -0.8  3.6 
Farm household type-C  0.1  0.4 
 
a Farm income from agriculture is made up of 57 percent from unskilled farm labor, 
26 percent from agricultural land and 17 percent from farm capital, according to the 
GTAP database. In 1999 on average 51 percent of rural household income in China 
was earned outside agriculture, mostly from unskilled labor. Therefore, to illustrate 
the importance of those off-farm earnings for farm families, three types of farm 
households are shown in this table: it is assumed nonfarm unskilled labor contributes 
0 percent of total farm household income for type A, 30 percent for type B, and 60 
percent for type C.  
 
Source: Anderson, Ianchovichina and Huang (2004) and Ianchovichina and Martin 
(2004). 